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Abstract K-axiom-based epistemic closure for explicit knowledge is rejected for
even the most trivial cases of deductive inferential reasoning on account of the fact
that the closure axiom does not extend beyond a raw consequence relation. The rec-
ognition that deductive inference concerns interaction as much as it concerns con-
sequence allows for perspectives from logics of multi-agent information flow to be
refocused onto mono-agent deductive reasoning. Instead of modeling the information
flow between different agents in a communicative or announcement setting, we model
the information flow between different states of a single agent as that agent reasons
deductively. The resource management of the database of agent states for the deductive
reasoning fragment in question is covered by the residuated structure that encodes the
nonassociative Lambek Calculus with permutation, bottom, and identity: NLP01.
Keywords Closure · Epistemic logic · Interaction · Information · Commutation ·
Non-association · Mobiles · NLP · Residuated structures · Categorical grammars ·
Lambek
1 Introduction
That logic concerns interaction just as much as it concerns consequence is an insight
has most eagerly been adopted in various logics of multi-agent information flow, such
as Public Announcement Logics, and Dynamic Epistemic Logics and so forth (van
Benthem 2009; Baltag et al. 1998; Baltag and Smetts 2008; van Ditmarsh et al. 2008).
What we will see, is that paying proper attention to interaction also has a rich payoff
for mono-agent, deductive scenarios. The basic idea is this; instead of examining the
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information flow between different agents in a communicative setting, we examine
the information flow between different states of a single agent as the agent reasons
deductively. We will see also how this approach has its roots in the the pure func-
tion application of the Categorical Grammar literature, due to Ajdukiewicz (1935),
Lambek (1958), and Lambek (1961).
The first step, undertaken in Subsect. 1.1, is to motivate the move to an interactive
epistemic logic by looking at epistemic closure. This will take us into issues involving
universal and existential modalities (Subsect. 1.2), implicit and explicit knowledge
(Subsect. 1.3), and finally to the epistemic relevance of the distinction between exter-
nal conjunction and internal conjunction (Subsect. 1.4). With the motivation in place,
we will be in a position to put the relevant model together. This is the task undertaken
in Sect. 2.
1.1 Motivation: epistemic closure
As motivation, consider the K-axiom:
(φ ⇒ ψ) ⇒ (φ ⇒ ψ) (1)
interpreted epistemically, so as to get epistemic closure:
Kα(φ ⇒ ψ) ⇒ (Kαφ ⇒ Kαψ) (2)
By “interpreted epistemically” we mean that Kα X is read as agent α knows that
X. This is importantly distinct from faux-epistemic interpretations such as agent α is
entitled to believe that X, in which case K would be a deontic permissibility operator,
not an epistemic one (or more realistically, an iteration of a deontic permissibility
operator and a doxastic belief operator, see (3) in Subsect. 1.2 below). The concep-
tual difference is stark enough, but the formal difference is starker still. This formal
difference turns on the distinction between universal and existential modalities.
1.2 Universal and existential modalities
The permissibility operator (as well as the belief operator) is an existential modality
whilst the knowledge operator is a universal one: Taking necessity ‘’ and possibility
‘♦’ (either metaphysical or logical will do) as the canonical examples, then as per
the textbook exposition, a formula is necessarily true iff it holds at all points in the
relevant model, whilst by contrast a formula is possibly true iff it holds at some points
in the relevant model. We have similarly contrasting modality pairs with knowledge
and belief, as well as obligation and entitlement/permission: the canonical semantics
takes the relevant atomic formulas constructed out of the first modality in each pair to
hold at all points in the model, and takes those constructed out of the second to hold
at some points in the model.
Keeping track of the universal and existential status of modalities in various multi-
modal logics is complex enough so that it is common practice to ‘box’ or ‘diamond’
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the various modal operator letters in order to keep track of their universal/existential
status. That is, a universal modality ‘m’ will be written as ‘[m]’, and an existential
modality ‘m’ will be written as ‘〈m〉’. To reiterate, examples of universal modalities
are those such as necessity: , knowledge: [k] and obligation: [o], with their corre-
sponding existential modalities being possibility: ♦, belief: 〈b〉 and entitlement: 〈e〉
respectively.1 In this case, closure under belief entitlement comes out as follows:
〈e〉〈b〉α(A ⇒ B) ⇒ (〈e〉〈b〉α A ⇒ 〈e〉〈b〉α B) (3)
As rich a philosophical potential as (3) might have, we note that (3) is not an instance
of the K-axiom. Having fixed on the K-axiom, we need to fix on the type of knowledge
involved.
1.3 Implicit knowledge and explicit knowledge
We take K to stand for explicit knowledge. If we were to take K to stand for implicit
knowledge, then closure would hold trivially, and tell us nothing epistemically inter-
esting at all. The reason for this is straightforward enough: By taking K to stand for
implicit knowledge, we force a collapse between what follows deductively from the
agent’s knowledge-base on the one hand, and what the agent knows on the basis of
this knowledge-base on the other. They simply become the very same thing. Implicit
knowledge does away with any requirement of awareness or realisation. For knowl-
edge to be of any use to an agent with respect to guiding the agent’s actions, be the
actions cognitive or behavioural, the agent must be aware of the information inside
the scope of the knowledge operator. Simply put, knowledge is not of any actual use
until it becomes explicit.
By taking Kα X to encode agent α knows that X under explicit knowledge, closure
becomes an interesting epistemic principle. It is also false. It is not merely false in
the sense that it fails to hold for suitably complex instances of deductive inference. It
is false in the sense that it fails to hold for any instance whatsoever. Closure fails to
hold for any instance of deductive inference from an agent’s knowledge-base because
closure merely expresses a static consequence relation, and deductive reasoning is an
essentially dynamic, non-static process.
This is precisely where interaction comes in: Even if α explicitly knows that A ⇒ B,
and also explicitly knows that A, it never follows simply on the basis of this (where
this conjunction is Boolean), that α then explicitly knows that B. At least not when
this conjunction is Boolean, or external.
1.4 External conjunction and internal conjunction
The distinction between external, or Boolean conjunction and internal conjunction is
brought out nicely via precisely these epistemic considerations. Suppose that Kα X
1 By “corresponding existential modalities”, we do not mean to suggest that all such modality pairs are
duals.
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and that KαY , then we may truthfully state that Kα(X ∧ Y ). However, it may well
be the case the α has never been aware of this conjunctive proposition, despite being
aware of the conjuncts independently. This situation will occur, for instance, when the
knowledge-states that X and that Y have occurred to α at suitably distinct times. Bool-
ean conjunction is known as external conjunction precisely because of this external
perspective taken on a system’s states (and an agent is just one type of system).
For α to come to know that B on the basis of knowing the premises, α must merge
or combine the information that the premises encode. This is how the gap between
what follows deductively from an agent’s knowledge-base on the one hand, and what
the agent comes to know explicitly on the basis of that same knowledge-base on the
other, is bridged. It is here that we must acknowledge the role of interaction for mono-
agent deductive-reasoning scenarios. To model this adequately, we need an internal
conjunction that brings the interactive/combinatorial information-merging reasoning
actions of the agent to the foreground. We also need a few other things (but not many).
1.5 Onwards
In Sect. 2 we will see how a nonassociative and structure-preserving commutative
logic of mobiles (half way between sequences and multisets, see Moortgat (1995))
with an operational semantics will deliver a useful model. In Sect. 3, we will see how
some residuation conditions allow us to translate between the instructions for a suc-
cessful reasoning procedure, and the executions of these instructions that underpin the
reasoning procedure itself.
2 Weakly commuting interaction models
A semantics is operational if it allows an explicit representation of semantic opera-
tions on individual points in the model Buszkowski (1986). In the model below, the
points are understood as information states. This though, is still fairly general. Since
we are concerned with the information flow in deductive inference, the points are to be
understood as information-bearing states of an agent as the agent reasons deductively.
This information-bearing is taken to be explicit knowledge. The interplay between the
semantics so understood and the resulting syntax is philosophically interesting: The
information in a database will be structured in different ways, depending on the use to
which the information is to be put. We can think of this structure as a type of database
grammar. The grammar will set the constraints as to structure of the database. In short,
we will specify the grammar of a fragment of the “cognitive langauge” of deductive
reasoning.
This first thing to do is to get a weakly commuting frame up and running. This is the
task of Subsect. 2.1. Weak commutation is simply what happens when commutation
is present, but association is not. There is a small terminological point that needs to be
made at this point. Commuting but non-associating logics are not all that common. A
consequence of this is that terms such as “commutation”, “permutation”, “exchange”
and so on, are variously used to denote both pure pair-wise one-place swaps, and also a
stronger n-place commutation that follows from the one-place variety plus association.
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A neat heuristic is this—in commutative nonassociative logics, we are restricted to
pairs, although the left and right-hand members of these pairs may trade places harm-
lessly. With logics that both commute and associate, we are not restricted to pairs, and
members may switch as many places as they like. This is a little abstract for now, but
is laid out in detail below.
With this done, in Subsect. 2.2 we look at the well-known case of fully
non-commuting examples from natural language semantics via categorical grammar.
This is not merely an aside, but will give us the conceptual framework of databases
and information processing that is central to the perspective worked out and adopted
for mono-agent deductive reasoning. The next step, undertaking in Subsect. 2.3 is
to build the resulting model on the back of the frame from 2.1 via an operational
semantics. With this in place, we will be in a position to make the structured informa-
tion processing properties relevant to interactive epistemic logic explicit (the business
of Subsect. 2.4). In Subsect. 2.5 we will see how to recover association and strong
commutation. In the final Subsect. 2.6, we will bring all of this together in order to
specify a fragment of the grammar of deductive reasoning. With this done, we will
be in a position to apply the framework explicitly to the case of mono-agent dynamic
reasoning. This the business of Sect. 3.
2.1 A commutating, non-associating information frame
Where A, B . . . are types of uninterpreted propositional formula φ,ψ, . . . such that
φ : A is read as formula φ is of type A, the language of our logic, the nonassociative
Lambek Calculus with permutation, bottom, and identity (NLP01) is given as follows:
A ::= φ | A | 0 | 1 | A ⊗ B | A  B | A⊥ (4)
Take an information frame F 〈S,, •〉 with weak (one place) commutation and
Cut, along with the two binary connectives ⊗, and , the unary connective ⊥, and
the constants 0 and 1. S is a set of incomplete, or partial information states x, y,….2
The binary relation  is a partial order on S of informational development/inclusion.
• is the (commutative and non-associative) binary composition operator on information
states. ⊗ is (commutative and non-associative) internal conjunction (merge/fusion).
 is interactive implication, and ⊥ is interactive negation on account of its being
defined in terms of  and 0:
A⊥ := A  0 (5)
0 is bottom, and 1 is unit/identity such that:
1 ⊗ A = A = A ⊗ 1 (6)
2 In doxastic cases, we would allow for inconsistency also. But since knowledge is factive if anything is,
we disallow this property here.
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Hence we have weak commutation around state-combination, and (correspond-
ingly) merge, and weak-weak commutation around identity. Weak-weak commuta-
tion around identity is standard enough. Weak commutation (around combination and
fusion) allows pair-wise one-place swaps: x •y = y•x at least insofar as informational
progress is concerned, and A⊗ B = B⊗ A at least insofar as derivability is concerned.
That is, for our interactions, commutation is permissible within the parameters of the
given bracketing. Hence the following are of the same type:
A ⊗ (B ⊗ C) | A ⊗ (C ⊗ B) | (C ⊗ B) ⊗ A | (B ⊗ C) ⊗ A (7)
whereas:
B ⊗ (A ⊗ C) (8)
differs. Exactly why it is that this should be the case for a base-calculus in the context
of a significant fragment of mono-agent deductive reasoning is made clear in Sect. 2.4
below. There is a difference in other contexts, natural language grammatical ones say,
where strict preservation of left–right attachment–detachment is crucial. The natural
language semantics cases from categorical grammar are not merely formal relatives.
They in fact give us a the starting point for the very conceptual framework that we
need.
2.2 Categorical grammars: pure sequences, and pairs
This starting point is to understand a natural language lexicon as a database of sorts, and
the grammar (in this case the strict ordering preservation) as a collection of constraints
on the processing of that database.
This ordering preservation is due to the fact that natural languages tend to have frag-
ments with exact rules for the ordering of words. For example, ‘Frederike peddles’ is
grammatically well-formed, whereas ‘Peddles Frederike’ is not. In this manner, the
intransitive verb ‘peddles’ is of type n → s, since when it is applied to the right of
a noun (type n), the result is a sentence (type s). By contrast, the adjective ‘happy’
is of type n ← n. This is due to the fact that when ‘happy’ is applied to the left of
another noun, the result is another (complex) noun (phrase): ‘Happy Friederike’. In
logics with no commutation (other than possible weak–weak commutation around 1 if
1 is present), the structures are at least pure sequences, and if associativity is rejected
also, then they are pairs.
This much is familiar from the categorical grammar literature. What is less familiar
is the following useful way of describing the relevant semantic constraints. We can
think of natural language (in particular a natural language lexicon) as a database. In
this case, a grammar may be thought of as a collection of processing constraints on
the database. These processing constraints are operational in the strictest sense of the
term. The tell us which operations are permissible insofar as generating well-formed,
or meaningful, strings in the natural language is concerned. In informational terms,
they tell us which operations are permissible insofar as generating information is
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concerned. A detailed look at grammars as processing constraints on a database may
be found in Sequoiah–Grayson (2009b).
For our purposes here however, all we note is that a natural language lexicon is only
one type of database. A consequence of this is that we may think of the processing
constraints on any database (and not simply natural language lexicons) as grammars.
This is precisely what is done below with the database relevant to mono-agent deduc-
tive reasoning. The rest of this section is dedicated to developing this idea in more
detail. The first step is to specify the relevant model.
2.3 The model
A model M := 〈F,〉 is an ordered pair F 〈S,, •〉 and  such that  is an evaluation
relation that holds between members of S and formulas constructed out of our binary
connectives ⊗, and , and constants 0 and 1. In what follows, we will often write
x, y, . . . ∈ F as shorthand for x, y, . . . ∈ S where S ∈ F. Where A is a propositional
formula, and x, y, z ∈ F,  obeys the heredity or monotonicity condition:3
For all A, if x  A and x  y, then y  A. (9)
And also obeys the following conditions for each of our connectives and constants:
x  A ⊗ B iff for some y, z,∈ F s.t. y • z  x, y  A and z  B. (10)
x  A  B iff for all y, z ∈ F s.t. x • y  z, if y  A then z  B. (11)
x  0 for no x ∈ F. (12)
x  A⊥[A  0] iff for all y, z ∈ F s.t. x • y  z, if y  A then z  0. (13)
x  1 iff x ∈ T, for all x ∈ F. (14)
(14) is less straightforward than are (10–13). We firstly define the set of propositions
Prop(F) on our frame F as the set of all subsets X of S ∈ F such that they are upwardly
closed: if x ∈ X and x  x ′, then x ′ ∈ X .
We can now see how it is that T in (14) is a truth set. Truth sets come in left and
right versions. For any subset T of Prop(F):
• T is a left truth set iff for all y, z ∈ F, y  z iff for some x ∈ T, x • y  z.
• T is a right truth set iff for all y, z ∈ F, y  z iff for some x ∈ T, y • x  z.
Given that we have commutation on our frame, our truth set T is non-directional.
In other words, since x • y = y • x , the left and right truth sets collapse into a single,
non-directional truth set. The converse does not hold. The “for some x ∈ T ” constraint
in the right hand clause of both truth set conditions allows us to restrict commutation
to just these x . This is what allows 1 to commute around propositions in logics that
are otherwise non-commutative. Intuitively, the state x carrying the information 1
3 We would drop this condition for certain doxastic scenarios where non-monotonicity is a distinctive
property.
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behaves around other states in the same manner as does 1 around propositions (see (6)
in Subsect. 2.1 above).
With the model conditions laid bare via the operational semantics, we can look at
how the various connectives deliver with respect to information processing environ-
ments.
2.4 Databases and information processing
Our merge and implication connectives interrelate in the following manner:
A ⊗ B  C iff B  A  C (15)
(15) is the standard residuation condition, the algebraic counterpart to implication
intro/elim. Residuation conditions encode various substructural logics, with the inter-
esting properties of residuated structures (i.e. their conditions) being captured via the
presence or absence of various structural rules. In our case we are understanding the
residuation condition in (15) to specify the processing constraints on a database.
We take  to be a processing-gate in the sense that X  A is read as processing the
information in X generates the information that A. Exactly what it is that processing
amounts to depends on the structure of the database in question, which is in turn fixed
by the structural rules at work. Since the merge operation is simply combination, and
not directional application, we get A  B  C from A ⊗ B  C by commuting on
A ⊗ B so as to get B ⊗ A. This is one sense in which we depart from Ajdukiewicz’s
original contribution to categorical grammar, since we do not need to keep track of
left–right attachment–detachment. The only structural rule we will admit except for
Weak Commutation is Cut. Cut is important for making use of the relevent information
interactions at work in basic inference. Association however, is not. To see this, set
the following (labels occur inside brackets):
φ ⇒ ψ(A), σ ⇒ φ(B), σ (C), φ(D), ψ(E) (16)
In such a case, we have it that:
A ⊗ (C ⊗ B)  E (17)
(17) is a result of Cutting on D, since:
C ⊗ B  D, and A ⊗ D  E . (18)
It is in this sense that cut underpins the most fundamental notion of information
interaction, or processing. However, suppose that we were to associate on (17). In this
case, we would have it that:
(A ⊗ C) ⊗ B  E (19)
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This is not good. The result of combining the information in A with the information
in C is nothing such that were it to be applied to the information in B we would get the
information in E. In fact, no information results from the combination of information
encoded by A with information encoded by C . Such an attempt is a “dead process”,
that cannot be carried out. To see this, we introduce types; given that φ ⇒ ψ(A) and
σ(C), it is the case that φ ⇒ ψ : C⊥. Hence φ ⇒ ψ : C  0 via (5). For any state
x  C  0, we know that it is that case that if we combine this information with any
other state y s.t. y  A, then the result will be a state z s.t. z  0 via (13). However,
we know that 0 is not supported via any state via (12).
In information processing terms, some information is of type C⊥ iff its combination
with information of type C can never generate any information. This is a conceptually
parsimonious way of reading the frame condition in (13). Taking interactive implica-
tion to be functional, along the lines of the Lambek Calculi, then C⊥ is the type of
function that can never take information of type C as an input, on account of it never
outputting any information on the basis of inputs of this type. This makes perfect sense
in our interactive/dynamic setting. In a static setting, negation is ruling out truth. In
an interactive/dynamic setting however, negation will rule out particular interactions,
or processes.4
Now we can see why it is that a strong, unrestricted (two-place) commutation is
just as “de-railing” as associativity. This would allow us to get from (A ⊗ B) ⊗ D to
(A ⊗ D) ⊗ B—but now just set φ(A), φ ⇒ ψ(B), ψ(C), ψ ⇒ σ(D), σ (E). Sim-
ilar results can be gotten for the other structural rules by adjusting the setup in (16)
appropriately, see Sequoiah–Grayson (2009c). Importantly, strong-commutation and
association are not independent.
2.5 Strong-commutation recovery and association recovery
Weak-commutation with associativity recovers strong-commutation, and weak-com-
mutation with strong-commutation recovers associativity:
• For the first recovery, start with (A ⊗ B) ⊗ D, then associate to get A ⊗ (B ⊗ D),
then weakly-commute to get A ⊗ (D ⊗ B), then associate again to get (A ⊗ D)⊗
B). unionsq
• For the second recovery, start with A ⊗ (B ⊗ D), and strongly commute to get
B ⊗ (A ⊗ D), then weakly-commute to get (A ⊗ D)⊗ B, then strongly-commute
to get (A ⊗ B) ⊗ D). unionsq
4 Negation in a dynamic setting as process exclusion is a topic unto itself. We can extend the operation
into a fully directional process exclusion system by dropping even weak commutation. This will allow us
to split our interactive implication  into a double implication pair 〈→,←〉, that will in turn allow us to
define a split negation pair 〈∼,¬〉 which we may define as ∼A := A → 0 and ¬A := 0 ← A respectively.
For an examination of logic-invariant split-negation properties in terms of process exclusion, as well as an
examination of its philosophical status, see Sequoiah–Grayson (2009a). For a working through of a series
examples of process exclusion, both directional and non-directional, as well as an examination of the con-
nections with the related notion of negation as test-failure in dynamic predicate logic, see Sequoiah–Grayson
(2009b).
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In otherwords, we have generative as well as independent reasons to reject associativity
and strong-commutation.
With this much done, we are in a position to specify the processing-constraints, or
grammar, of a fragment of mono-agent deductive reasoning.
2.6 The grammar of deductive reasoning
The grammar of deductive reasoning, a cognitive-language if you will, has obvi-
ous fragments with useful properties captured by a commuting, non-associating (i.e.
weakly-commuting) logic. The logic corresponds to NLP: the nonassociative Lambek
Calculus with permutation, where permutation is understood in the pair-wise sense
such that is amounts to:
x • y  z = y • x  z (20)
Specifying explicitly the pairwise nature of the permuting operation is not redun-
dant. This is because it is commonplace in the literature to use ‘permutation’ to
denote the strong-commutation that follows from commutation, or pairwise per-
mutation, and association. This is a simple function of the fact that commu-
tating, non-associating logics have are rare, so the resulting stronger permuting
operation, allowing permutations through bracketing, or structure, has been the
default.
The structure of the data-base on the left-hand-side of the processing gate ,
that is X in X  A that is specified by the grammar is that of mobiles. Mobiles
are simply non-associating but bracket-sensitive-commutating structures. Since we
can get strong-commutation from weak-commutation if we also have association,
the addition of association would collapse the structure of our data-base into mul-
tisets (since we do not have contraction). But multisets have no structure at all,
they have merely a taxonomy. Mobiles have some structure, but less than do pure
sequences (where even pair-wise commutation is prohibited). If we had neither com-
mutation nor association, we would have static pairs, with a fixed left component
and a fixed right component. Mobile may be thought of as mobile pairs, which is
what they really are after all; pairs whose left and right components may switch
places.
It is important to appreciate that what is happening here is not simply syntac-
tic (although it can be read off the syntax, which is part of the appeal). Merge
(along with our implication) is being interpreted as a relation between informa-
tion states. It is in this sense that interaction structures (so-christened due to their
being constituted by interactive conjunctions) such as that on the left hand side
of (17): A ⊗ (C ⊗ B), are robustly semantic. Two interaction structures with the
same form will not necessarily be equivalent, since they may be underpinned by
different information states. Extracting the step-wise information state combina-
tions across S corresponding to the relevant interaction structures is a straight-
forward mechanical task involving nothing more than successive applications of
the conditions outlined by (10) above. This is most easily seen via some exam-
ples.
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3 Mono-agent dynamic reasoning
In Subsect. 3.1 we will look at information processing operations underpinning interac-
tion structures, as well as those processing operations underpinning the corresponding
processing structures; those conditional information processing structures got from
interaction structures via the residuation conditions in (15). The task undertaken in
Subsect. 3.2 is to interpret interaction structures and processing structures in terms
of mono-agent deductive reasoning actions. Processing structures will be interpreted
as instructions, and interaction structures will be interpreted as executions of these
instructions.
3.1 Interaction structures and processing structures
With respect to (17): A⊗(C⊗B)  E , we have the following corresponding step-wise
information state combination:
x A ⊗ (C ⊗ B) iff for some w, y, z ∈ F s.t. w • (y • z)  x,
w A, y  C, and z  B.
(21)
The information states x, y, . . . ∈ S may be naturally interpreted as states of α as
α reasons deductively. In this case, the information state combination w • (y • z)[ x]
specifies the step-wise reasoning procedure that α must engage in in order to be truth-
fully said to know (on the basis of the premises at least) the result of the merged
propositions, namely ψ . Since, y  C, and z  B via (21), and σ(C) and σ ⇒ φ(B)
via (16), y • z  v, where v  D, and φ(D) via (16). Since w  A via (21) and
φ ⇒ ψ(A) via (16), w • v  x , where x  E and ψ(E) via (16). unionsq
Via (15), we can transform interaction structures into iterated conditional informa-
tion processing structures. Still taking (17) as our case, via three applications of (15)
and one application of (6), we generate:
1  B  (C  (A  E)) (22)
From A ⊗ (C ⊗ B)  E we get C ⊗ B  A  E via the first application of (15).
From C ⊗ B  A  E we get B  C  (A  E) via the second application of
(15). From B  C  (A  E) we get B ⊗ 1  C  (A  E) via (6). From
B ⊗ 1  C  (A  E) we apply our third and final instance of (15) in order to get
1  B  (C  (A  E)). unionsq
We can understand the processing structure on the right hand side of (22) as a typed
function. It is the type of function that takes inputs of type B, and returns another
function as the output. The function that it returns as an output is the type of function
that takes inputs of type C, and returns yet another function as an output. This function
is the type of function that takes inputs of type A and returns an output of type E (which
in our case is ψ , since ψ(E) via (16).
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Similarly to interaction structures, the processing structures/function types are indi-
viduated by information states. With respect to (22), and via (11), we have the follow-
ing:
x  B  (C  (A  E))iff for all s, t, v, w, y, z ∈ F s.t. ((x • y) • v) • t  s,
if z  C  (A  E), and y  B, and w  A  E, and v  C, and t  A,
then s  E . (23)
Since x • y  z, z • v  w, and w • t  s. 
We can now turn our attention to examining the conceptual relationship between
interaction structures and processing structures on the one hand, and mono-agent
deductive reasoning on the other. The following section explains how it is that we may
sensibly interpret processing structures and interaction structures as instructions and
the executions of those instructions respectively.
3.2 Instructions and executions
How might we think of the interaction structures such as that in (21) and their cor-
responding processing structures such as that in (23) with respect to our wider con-
cern with interactive mono-agent reasoning? We can think of processing structures as
instructions, and of their corresponding interaction structures as the result of carrying
out or executing the corresponding instruction, i.e., as executions.
Take the instruction in (23). If α is in state x , then α is on her way to knowing
explicitly that ψ , but she is not there yet. α’s being in state x means that α knows
explicitly what is required in order that she come to know explicitly that ψ . Her
first step is to establish B(σ ⇒ φ), which involves her being in state y. Her second
step is to combine this state y with her previous state x . In other words, we read
the iterated state-combination sequence corresponding to process structures such as
((x • y) • v) • t[ s] in (23) from the inside-out.
This first interaction or merge will result in two things. α will know explicitly that
B, and also be in a new state z  C  (A  E) which follows from this first interac-
tion. This corresponds to the first leftwards-transfer across the processing-gate. That
is, α has moved from 1  B  (C  (A  E)) to B ⊗ 1  (C  (A  E)) with
the establishing of B allowing α to get rid of 1 and arrive at B  (C  (A  E)).
How might we interpret 1? That is, how might we make sense of the initial state
x of α s.t. x  1? We do so in exactly the sense stipulated above; α being in state x
which carries the information that 1, is simply that state in which α knows what steps
must be taken in order to establish E , and hence be in state s. But knowing the steps
to take is not the same thing as having actually taken them.
The next step for α is for her to establish σ(C), which entails that she be in state
v  C . By combining v with z, α will then be in state w  A  E . This corresponds
to the second leftwards-transfer across the processing-gate, such that α has moved
from B  (C  (A  E)) to C ⊗ B  A  E . The final steps for α are that she
establish φ ⇒ ψ(A), which entails her being in state t  A. Then α must combine t
with her previous state w. This will entail α being in state s  E , where ψ(E). This
123
Synthese (2013) 190:113–128 125
corresponds to the third left-wards move across the processing-gate, such that α has
moved from C ⊗ B  A  E , to A ⊗ (C ⊗ B)  E .
What has occurred is this: By following the instructions laid out in the process-
ing structure, α has extracted the very interaction structure who’s “activation” will
cause her to know explicitly that ψ . This fact has a straightforward interpretation in
terms of the data-base structure, or grammar, of the “cognitive langauge” of deduc-
tive reasoning. The interpretation of the end-results of applications of the residuation
conditions in (15) as instructions and executions is a powerful one. The instructions
tell us how to construct a well-formed sentence in the cognitive language of deductive
reasoning in precisely the same manner as the types in categorical grammar instruct
us on constructing well-formed terms or sentences in natural language. In natural
language, if the result of one of these constructions is uttered (or conceived of) by
an agent, then information is transmitted to other agents. Something meaningful, or
informationally well-behaved, will have occurred.
The deductive reasoning case is the same. When the results of carrying out the
instructions are executed, something informationally well-behaved has occurred. In
this case, the occurrence is that the agent has accessed the information in the con-
clusion, or simply put; the agent is in a state such that the agent knows explicitly the
information that the conclusion encodes. That deductive reasoning procedures should
have their behaviour accurately described by formal tools originally developed to
specify that mathematical behaviour of natural language semantics is, ultimately, not
as surprising as it might first appear. After all, when we are engaged in explicit acts
of deductive reasoning, it is rather like we are talking to ourselves.
Mobiles impose the relevant constraints on the grammar for the simple reason that
left–right exchange within pairs is harmless for a significant fragment of deductive
reasoning. It is by no means the case that such constraints may not be either relaxed
or strengthened (more on this in the following section), but they are a useful place to
start.
4 Conclusion
By paying proper attention to consequence and interaction in logic, we have a system
of resource-management and processing on the database of mono-agent reasoning
dynamics. Although what we have is far from a complete set of constraints, or a full
grammar (more on this below), what do have, hopefully, is a proof of concept. In
Subsect. 4.2 we will revisit the notion of epistemic closure in light of the addition
of dynamic information-merging operations. The final task, undertaking in 4.3 is too
sketch the direction for future research. The first step however, is a brief review.
4.1 Summary
In terms of grammatically obedient databases or “sentences” in the language of deduc-
tive reasoning, the processing structures are instructions for constructing a grammati-
cally well-formed sentence in the language. The resulting interaction structures are the
very grammatically well-formed sentences in the language of deductive reasoning that
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the processing structures are intended to bring about. That is, in exactly the same way
that types in linguistic applications of Categorical Grammars give you the instructions
for well-formed sentences in the grammar of natural language, the processing struc-
tures/types here give you the instructions for grammatically well-formed “sentences”
in the cognitive-grammar of deductive reasoning.
Whether or not such sentences are well-formed is a function of their input/output
relations. To make the point again, if σ(A) and φ ⇒ ψ(B), then A ⊗ B is not well-
formed, since it is the case that φ ⇒ ψ : A⊥, or φ ⇒ ψ : A → 0. In the fragment of
deductive reasoning that we are considering, if we were to allow associativity or strong
commutation (or any of the other well-known structural rules), then we would allow
grammatical transformations, or transformations on the structure of the database, that
would ruin the ability of information to flow.
The information in a database will be structured in various ways depending on the
data-types it contains. The constraints turn on the use to which the information is to be
put. The database structure, or grammar, of the “cognitive language” of mono-agent
deductive reasoning, may be sensibly said to have many of its interesting base-prop-
erties captured by the residuated structure encoding mobiles with bottom and identity,
namely NLP01.
4.2 Epistemic closure revisited
With this much in place, where do we stand on our motivating principle from Sub-
sect. 1.1? Taking (X ⊗ Y )α to stand for α’s merging of X and Y , we might lay out a
working principle for epistemic closure:
Kα(φ ⇒ ψ) ∧ Kαφ ⇒ (((φ ⇒ ψ) ⊗ φ)α ⇒ Kαψ) (24)
However, this would be a mistake. Until the structure of the data-base is specified
(equivalently, until the grammar of the relevant fragment of the cognitive language
of deductive reasoning is specified), such a dynamic information-merging principle is
not particularly interesting in itself. In fact, one of the goals of this article has been to
demonstrate that such an approach is wrong-headed from the start.
The problem with (2) is that it is a static consequence principle, and knowledge is
the result of dynamic reasoning (or communicative) scenarios. Not only are counte-
rexamples too easy to come by, but in the case of static axioms like (2), there are only
counterexamples. Dynamic, or interactive axioms such as (24) do not deliver much
more.
The problem is a methodological one. The interesting epistemic principles are
those concerning the structural and dynamic properties of the data-bases relevant to
particular epistemic contexts: mono-agent, multi-agent, empirical-information, deduc-
tive/inductive/abductive-reasoning, recall-constraints, communication-variance, and
combinations of these and more. If such epistemic contexts are not specified, then
for particular epistemic axioms to be true, they will need to be at such a generalised
level of abstraction that it is unlikely that they will tell us anything interesting at all.
Consider the T-Axiom:
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φ ⇒ φ (25)
under an epistemic interpretation so as to get:
Kαφ ⇒ φ (26)
(26) is a perfect example of just this. (26) is true in absolutely any episte-
mic context whatsoever. However it is not telling us anything interesting about
any of these contexts, nor for that matter is it telling us anything interesting
about the knowledge-states of agents, apart from the definitional one—if it is true
that an agent knows that A, then it is true that A. We need more than this. We
also need a methodological basis that can reliably deliver more than this for an
analysis of the full range of dynamic properties at work in deductive reasoning
actions.
If there is one thing that dynamic/interactive epistemic logic should take from static
epistemic logic, it is the knowledge that there is little to gain from top–down syntac-
tic-axiom-driven approaches. Modern research in modal logic has long abandoned
such an approach, witness (Blackburn et al. 2002). For epistemic logic (that is based
on modal logic after all) to contribute to our understanding of the rich tapestry of
epistemic contexts that underpin our success as rational agents in the natural world, it
should follow suit. Where to next?
4.3 The future
We might think of the fragment of deductive reasoning that we have examined here
as the commutation invariant fragment. It is a natural place to start with an anal-
ysis, as commutative-invariant residuated structures underpin the base-calculas of
mono-agent deductive reasoning at the level of abstraction of uninterpreted propo-
sitional types. Here, every process is commutation invariant.5 Commutation variant
types will only arise in the presence of other structural rules, in which case they
will not be pure commutation variant types, but rather commutation + rule-x variant
types.
There will also be fragments of deductive reasoning that are rule-x invariant where
commutation is disallowed, as well as fragments that are commutation + rule-x invari-
ant, and so on. We should think of these invariant fragments as grammatical categories
in the cognitive language of deductive reasoning, in just the same way as we do with
structural-rule-invariant fragments of natural language. Specifying the full grammar
of the cognitive language of mono-agent deductive reasoning will involve mapping
out just these relations between various invariant and variant types. The present article
has been an attempt to contribute to a fragment of such an investigation.
5 In interpreted contexts, strict temporal preservation, corresponding to commutative variance will obvi-
ously have a roll to play.
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